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ALL TOGETHER NOW: THE FAMILY OF MARKS 





While a significant doctrine within common law trademark, the family 
of marks doctrine has not been utilized by as many dominant corporations 
within the fifty years since its creation as one might expect. This may be because 
the doctrine and its analysis remains rather opaque with little substantive legal 
research devoted to its history and framework and with a pastiche of case law 
that, on first blush, fails to signal a clear, uniform approach among the circuits. 
The doctrine itself, however, has been a deft tool in the hands of certain 
corporations who have used it to protect the prized goodwill created in their 
respective corporate trademarks. McDonald’s Corp. successfully used the 
doctrine to ward off use of the “Mc” prefix in a number of commercial 
scenarios, including those involving the sale of food products or restaurants and 
those that did not. The doctrine appeared uniquely crafted to serve such high 
profile corporations, whose corporate trademark transcended markets and 
product lines. Fast-forward twenty years from the era of the Big Mac to the era 
of the iPhone. The value of the protection of the family mark remains relevant 
whether the product is a hamburger or highly complex electronic equipment. Its 
value is in the protection of the trademark providence of the brand. This is 
especially reflected in the virtually unlimited creative opportunities Apple, Inc. 
(Apple) promises as seen from its innovations in several consumer electronics 
marketsthe mp3 player, the cellular phone, the lap-top and personal 
computers, and online licensing of music copyrights. In this Article, I seek to 
clarify the proper analysis framing issues involving the family of marks doctrine 
by tracing its history up to the seminal case of McDonald’s Corp. v. McBagel’s, 
Inc., in which McDonald’s right to use the “Mc” mark was respected against a 
nascent yet oblique competitor. I finally contend that, after clarifying the 
analysis, the doctrine will be useful to Apple, as it was to McDonald’s, to further 
command the direction of its brand by eliminating competing uses that directly 
or indirectly seek to usurp Apple’s goodwill. 
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Over the last fifteen years Apple, Inc. (Apple) has taken significant steps 
to develop the strength of its brand through the creation and integration of many 
related products. One important way it has furthered its brand mythos has been 
through marketing under a common trademark style. By consistently using the 
“i” prefix, Apple has developed consumer recognition in a sizeable group of 
technological goods and an association between the unifying “i” prefix and 
Apple’s overall market success. However, Apple was not the first technology 
company to use the “i” prefix.1 Apple did not even originally own the rights to 
use the “iPhone” trademark when it began producing its smartphone.2 Even 
though it had arguably already acquired rights to trademarks bearing the “i” 
prefix, including “iMac,” “iPod,” and “iTunes,” two companiesInfoGear, Inc. 
(InfoGear) and Cisco Systems, Inc. (Cisco)acquired rights to the “iPhone” 
trademark before Apple.3 Undaunted by Cisco’s apparent prior ownership of the 
“iPhone” trademark at the development stage of Apple’s smartphone, Apple 
consciously subjected itself to potential trademark infringement liability by 
using the mark. Why would Apple willingly take on the risk of such costly 
litigation? The story of Apple’s settlement with Cisco and ultimate acquisition 
of the “iPhone” trademark helps to highlight Apple’s relentless protection of its 
“i” family of trademarks and demonstrates how Apple’s market position will 
enable it to effectively use the family of marks doctrine today. 
On January 9, 2007, Apple introduced the iPhone amid much speculation 
and excitement.4 Building off of Apple’s success with the iPod media player, 
Steve Jobs emphasized the importance of the new smart phone within the 
technology market of the day: “[T]oday, we’re introducing three revolutionary 
products . . . a widescreen iPod . . . a revolutionary mobile phone . . . and a 
breakthrough communications device . . . . These are not three separate devices, 
  
 1 See John E. Bredehoft, Has the i- Prefix Jumped the Shark?, EMPOPRISE-BI (Jan. 
26, 2010, 5:00 AM), http://empoprise-bi.blogspot.com/2010/01/has-i-prefix-jumped-
shark.html (Oracle’s 8i Database); see also Ed Burnette, Cisco Lost Rights to iPhone 
Trademark Last Year, Experts Say, ZDNET (Jan. 12, 2007, 4:35 PM), 
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/burnette/cisco-lost-rights-to-iphone-trademark-last-year-
experts-say/236 (Cisco’s use of the i-Phone trademark). 
 2 See Burnette, supra note 1. 
 3 See Steven Musil, Apple, Cisco Settle iPhone Trademark Lawsuit, CNET (Feb. 21, 
2007, 6:45 PM), http://news.cnet.com/apple,-cisco-settle-iphone-trademark-lawsuit/2100-
1041_3-6161233.html. 
 4 Tammy W. Cowart & Wade M. Chumey, I Phone, You Phone, We All Phone with 
iPhone: Trademark Law and Ethics from an International and Domestic Perspective, 28 
J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 331, 331 (2011). 
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this is one device, and we are calling it iPhone.”5 While the iPhone system was 
indeed revolutionary, Jobs’ choice of names was not.6 A company called 
InfoGear had previously registered the iPhone trademark in 1996 and began 
selling its iPhone in 1997.7 Cisco bought InfoGear and its trademark in 2000, 
and both InfoGear and Cisco used the trademark prior to Apple to market 
phones offering access to computer networks.8 
Before unveiling the iPhone, Apple talked to Cisco about purchasing the 
trademark, but when those talks failed Apple sought alternative methods.9 Apple 
created a limited liability company (LLC) called Ocean Telecom Services 
located offshore in the Bahamas for the purpose of filing an intent to use the 
mark with the USPTO.10 Ocean Telecom Services claimed a prior right to the 
mark based in international law.11 By using an offshore LLC, Apple could obtain 
a priority filing under the Madrid Protocol, which allows a trademark holder in 
another country to file an international registration with the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO).12 The owner then files for an extension for 
protection with the USPTO.13 If the date of international registration is not later 
than six months after the date of the first regular national filing in the United 
States, the international registrant obtains the same rights to validity as if the 
owner filed an initial registration with the USPTO. 14 To successfully use Ocean 
Telecom Services’ international registration, Apple would have claimed that 
because Cisco had not renewed its registration within the time limit set by the 
USPTO, Cisco’s ownership of the mark lapsed, and Apple’s international 
registration was entitled to priority. However, Apple never had to make that 
argument. 
On January 10, 2007, Cisco filed suit against Apple claiming Apple 
infringed its “iPhone” trademark.15 In the press concerning the litigation, it was 
  
 5 Steve Jobs, Complete Transcript of Steve Jobs, Macworld Conference and Expo 
(Jan. 9, 2007), available at http://www.iphonebuzz.com/complete-transcript-of-steve-
jobs-macworld-conference-and-expo-january-9-2007-23447.php. 
 6 Company Overview of InfoGear Technology Corporation, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/stocks/private 
/snapshot.asp?privcapId=29892 (last visited Nov. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Company 
Overview]. 
 7 Id.; IPHONE, Registration No. 2,293,011. 
 8 Company Overview, supra note 7. 
 9 Cowart & Chumey, supra note 5 at 331–32. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Complaint for Trademark Infringement, Unfair Competition, False Description, and 
Injury to Business Reputation and Demand for Jury Trial, Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Apple, 
Inc., No. 3:07-cv-00198-MHP, 2007 WL 118953 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2007). 
 




rumored that negotiations toward settlement initially stalled because Cisco 
wanted Apple to make its smart phone compatible with Cisco’s products.16 
Roughly one month after Cisco’s filing, the parties settled the lawsuit.17 In view 
of the tremendous success achieved with products such as iMac, iPhoto, iPod, 
and iTunes, though, could Apple have made a successful defense? Apple had 
spent over eight years and hundreds of millions of dollars developing and 
extending the success of its “i” mark before the litigation, consumers anticipated 
the unveiling of Apple’s smart phone, and the market assumed that Apple’s 
phone would be the “iPhone.”18 Although Cisco had bought the first registration, 
it had not developed the amount of consumer recognition Apple had at the time 
of Jobs’ unveiling. At that time, Apple’s market success was undeniable. Had 
Apple been more aggressive in the litigation, was it clear that Cisco’s blanket 
claim of priority would solidify its legal ownership of the “i” prefix? 
InfoGear and then Cisco first used the “iPhone” trademark roughly one 
year before Apple even began using the “i” prefix with the iMac.19 If Apple had 
pursued litigation with Cisco there was a real chance that Cisco could have 
asserted a prior right to the mark notwithstanding Apple’s consumer recognition 
or the argument that Cisco had abandoned the mark.20 By owning the first filing, 
Cisco was entitled to assert a rebuttable presumption of prior ownership.21 If 
Cisco were successful, and obtained a permanent injunction against Apple, one 
of Apple’s key products would not have been as both Apple intended and the 
consumer electronics market expected. Apple would also have been inhibited 
from extending its successful line of “i” products in the cell phone market. 
Apple did have arguments of its own had the litigation progressed, but 
their success remained speculative in light of Cisco’s prior registration.22 Apple 
could have argued that its phone was materially different from Cisco’s and that, 
therefore, it did not pose a likelihood of confusion.23 An important fact 
bolstering this argument was that Cisco’s phone was designed for a dial-up 
internet connection, while Apple’s phone used wireless technology.24 Apple 
  
 16 Victoria Shannon, Cisco Systems’ Chief Executive Calls Apple Lawsuit a ‘Minor 
Skirmish’, INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Jan. 27, 2007), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/25/technology/25iht-cisco.4338311.html?_r=0. 
 17 Cowart & Chumey, supra note 5, at 331–33. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Apple Inc., WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_Inc (last visited Nov. 
20, 2013). 
 20 Tom Krazit, How Apple Could Fight Cisco, CNET (January 12, 2007, 4:01 AM), 
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1041_3-6149755.html (“[N]o matter what [Apple] does, it is 
treading uphill because Cisco has a registered trademark with the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office . . . .”). 
 21 Id. 
 22 See Cowart & Chumey, supra note 5. 
 23 Id. (“[Apple is] the first company ever to use iPhone for a cell phone.”). 
 24 Id. 
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could have also argued that Cisco abandoned its iPhone mark because Cisco 
bought the mark in 2000 and did not use it until 2006 (under 15 U.S.C. § 1127, 
three years of consecutive non-use is prima facie evidence of having abandoned 
the trademark).25 Finally, Apple could have attempted to assert a family of 
marks argument, arguing that, because Cisco abandoned the prior registration, 
Apple’s creation of subsequent consumer recognition should be respected.26 In 
2006, when Cisco challenged Apple, Apple marketed at least six products under 
the “i” prefix and had developed significant consumer recognition. Ultimately, 
Apple sought to protect its investment and its “i” family mark through the 
security of settlement. Through Apple’s quick legal maneuvering it obtained 
rights to use the iPhone mark, ensured what would eventually be a substantial 
segment of its current market share, and further unified its product base. 
Commentators have noted that when consumers see the lowercase “i” 
they expect to see an Apple product and “all that goes with it.”27 Apple has 
continually broadened the scope of its “i” family, thereby pushing the 
boundaries over which its market influence reaches. The strides Apple has made 
in its business growth can be seen in the relatively short amount of time it has 
taken to expand from being primarily a producer of personal computers to 
becoming a computer, media player, cell phone, and internet commerce 
powerhouse, with the capability for additional growth in the future.28 Within a 
family of marks discussion, Apple’s growth creates interesting questions for 
determining exactly how broad Apple’s influence, consumer recognition, and 
corresponding protection should extend. 
Part I of this Comment provides an in-depth discussion of the history of 
the family of marks doctrine arising from the Lanham Act of 1946. In detailing 
the case law that has shaped the doctrine, this Part also offers the issues that 
frame the appropriate analysis surrounding it. Part I traces the common law 
growth of the doctrine from an unapplied idea to a working grounds for 
summary judgment. Part II of this Comment synthesizes the analysis drawn 
from Part I, with heavy influence from the Southern District of New York’s 
decision in McDonald’s Corp. v. McBagel’s, Inc., as a starting point from which 
to address how the doctrine may benefit Apple today. Part II concludes with 
three hypotheticals, which aim to clarify how Apple might use the doctrine 
through possible fact patterns. I conclude, by applying the doctrine to these 
hypotheticals, that Apple will likely succeed in a family of marks argument 
  
 25 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (three years of consecutive non-use is prima facie 
evidence of having abandoned the trademark); see also Cowart & Chumey, supra note 5, 
at 331–55. 
 26 See Krazit, supra note 21. 
 27 Michael J. Zussman, Taking a Bite from the Proverbial Apple: Intellectual 
Property for Attorneys and Entrepreneurs, 59-FEB. FED. LAW. 16, 17 (2012). 
 28 Apple, Inc., WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_Inc (last visited Nov. 
20, 2013). 
 




where the offending trademark occurs in a related market to the consumer 
electronics market Apple so clearly dominates. Part II also raises concerns for 
Apple if it fails to actively police its “i” family mark by addressing the 
possibility that third party use may become so prevalent that a court could find it 
has become the generic property of all technology or internet-based companies. 
I. HISTORY OF THE FAMILY OF MARKS DOCTRINE 
Section 1052 of the Lanham Act, the primary federal trademark statute 
within the United States Code, deals principally with the registration of 
trademarks.29 Within this section, sub-section (d) states: 
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished 
from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal 
register on account of its nature unless it . . . [c]onsists of or comprises a 
mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark 
Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by 
another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection 
with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or 
to deceive . . . .30 
The family of marks doctrine is a common law extension of the law prohibiting 
registration of marks or trade names that are likely to cause confusion, mistake, 
or deception with a pre-existing mark or trade name.31 Instead of prohibiting a 
name that is confusingly similar to an existing mark, the doctrine prohibits a 
name that is confusingly similar to a pre-existing group of marks, from which 
the owner of the group derives market utility because the market recognizes the 
collective uniqueness of the group.32 
A. Early Cases 
Initially the family of marks doctrine was solely a measure of a 
proprietary interest in a registered type of mark recurrently used by the 
trademark owner.33 In Burroughs Wellcome & Co. v. Mezger Pharmcal Co., the 
plaintiff appealed the Examiner of Interference’s dismissal of an opposition to 
the defendant’s application to register “Lipofax.”34 The plaintiff owned 
  
 29 15 U.S.C. § 1052; Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent 
Distinctiveness of Product Design Trade Dress, 75 N.C. L. REV. 471, 474 (1997) (“The 
Lanham Act provides protection . . . for words, symbols or designs that identify the 
source of a product—that are, in trademark parlance, ‘distinctive.’”). 
 30 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). 
 31 Creamette Co. v. Merlino, 299 F.2d 55, 58–59 (9th Cir. 1962). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Burroughs Wellcome & Co. v. Mezger Pharmacal Co., 228 F.2d 243, 243–44 
(C.C.P.A. 1955). 
 34 Id. at 243. 
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numerous marks that ended in the syllable “fax” and recurrently used the suffix 
to identify its products.35 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) 
determined that the plaintiff did not own a proprietary interest in the syllable 
because, not only was it the final syllable of common words, but a number of 
third parties had registered trademarks for similar products.36 The court in 
Burroughs suggested that if the plaintiff did not own a proprietary interest in the 
syllable “fax,” then the plaintiff’s case depended solely on whether consumers 
were likely to mistake any of their individual registrations for the defendant’s 
trademark.37 
Eventually courts began to use the doctrine not only to determine whether 
the proponent owned the family mark, but also to determine whether the 
subsequent mark presented a likelihood of confusion.38 In Lauritzen & Co. v. 
Borden Co., Borden opposed the registration of the trademark “Fortilac” based 
on its prior registrations of “Protolac,” “Breadlac,” “Starlac,” “Parlac,” 
“Akrelac,” and “Biolac.”39 Borden claimed its registered marks constituted a 
family of marks ending in “lac” and that the public would assume any new mark 
with that suffix would be its product.40 The court rejected this argument because 
“lac” is the Latin word for milk and all of the plaintiff’s marks applied to milk 
products. Because the court considered the Latin meaning ubiquitous, it 
considered “lac” dangerously close to being a generic mark, which precluded 
Borden from asserting distinctive ownership over it.41 Lauritzen also showed 
that there were at least five existing third party registrations of trademarks with 
the “lac” suffix.42 For these reasons, the court determined that Borden’s prior 
registrations had to be considered individually instead of constituting a family.43 
In the early 1960s, the CCPA set early difficult precedents for companies 
attempting to make family of marks arguments.44 The two Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp. cases reveal the court’s struggle to accept the doctrine’s very 
validity.45 Where the court did discuss the doctrine, its early approach seemed to 
suggest a policy in favor of permitting registration of arguably similar marks in 
the absence of evidence demonstrating actual consumer confusion.46 
  
 35 Id. at 244. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Lauritzen & Co. v. Borden Co., 239 F.2d 405, 406–07 (C.C.P.A. 1956). 
 39 Id. at 406. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 407. 
 42 Id. at 406. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Winter Seal Corp., 291 F.2d 945 
(C.C.P.A. 1961); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Jones Eng’g Co., 292 F.2d 294 
(C.C.P.A. 1961). 
 45 Winter Seal, 291 F.2d 945; Jones Eng’g, 292 F.2d 294. 
 46 Winter Seal, 291 F.2d at 946; Jones Eng’g, 292 F.2d at 296. 
 




In the first of these cases, Jones & Laughlin opposed the registration of 
Winter Seal’s “Jal-Master” mark, arguing that it was confusingly similar to its 
family of “jal” marks, which included “Jalcase,” “Jalloy,” “Jal-Duct,” “Jal-Dor,” 
“Jalten,” and “Jal-Zinc.”47 The court held that because the defendant’s goods 
were so different from the plaintiff’s, actual consumer confusion was unlikely.48 
In the second case, which also occurred in July 1961, Jones & Laughlin brought 
action to bar registration of Jones Engineering Company’s “Jal-O-Vent” mark.49 
The plaintiff opposed the defendant’s use, arguing that consumers were likely to 
confuse it with the plaintiff’s family of “jal” products.50 In support of this 
argument, the plaintiff offered the testimony of several members of the 
construction industry who stated that on encountering the defendant’s mark they 
would have believed it was one of the plaintiff’s.51 
In the first case, Jones & Laughlin failed to demonstrate a likelihood of 
confusion, in part, because it did not present any evidence demonstrating actual 
confusion. It sought to remedy this in the second case through the construction 
industry members’ statements.52 In weighing this evidence, however, the court 
found the witnesses’ statements did not offer any particular instances of actual 
confusion.53 It decided that their statements were hypothetical because they were 
based on what the construction industry members would have thought had they 
experienced the opposed’s trademark.54 The court stated that such speculative 
statements could not support instances of actual confusion because they were 
merely opinions.55 The court went on to say that the obvious differences in the 
sound, spelling, pronunciation, and meaning were “such to obviate any 
likelihood of confusion.”56 The only commonality was the “jal” prefix, which 
was clearly suggestive of the jalousie-type of doors on which the underlying 
products were used.57 The court held in the earlier Jones & Laughlin Steel case 
that the more a name suggests the nature of a good, the weaker its trademark 
strength.58 In the second case, the court utilized this analysis, citing its earlier 
finding that where “Jal” is coupled with “Dor” (a misspelling of “door”) the 
suggestive nature of both words weakens the overall strength of the mark.59 The 
  
 47 Winter Seal, 291 F.2d at 946. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Jones Eng’g, 292 F.2d. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 295. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 296. 
 57 Id. at 295. 
 58 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Winter Seal Corp., 291 F.2d 945, 946 (C.C.P.A. 
1961). 
 59 Jones Eng’g, 292 F.2d at 295. 
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court held the overall suggestive nature of “jal” precluded Jones & Laughlin 
from having a protectable family mark.60 
B. Validation of the Theory 
While the early cases seemed to be in agreement that there was such a 
thing called the family of marks doctrine, none of these courts had actually 
enforced it in real life. The doctrine seemed at risk of disappearing into disuse. 
This sentiment is clearly indicated by the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Creamette 
Co. v. Merlino.61 In Creamette, the plaintiff argued the defendant’s use of the 
unregistered mark “Majorette” to sell macaroni products infringed its registered 
trademark “Creamettes.”62 The court held that the plaintiff did not have an 
“indisputable right” to the exclusive use of the suffix “ette” because the suffix 
was so widely used to form a diminutive of common words.63 In fact, because 
use of the suffix for a variety of products was so pervasive, and because it was 
capable of being used in “an infinite variety of wholly dissimilar words,” the 
court doubted whether it could ever establish a family mark.64 
The court even went so far as to doubt the existence of the doctrine itself: 
“[s]ome cases squint at the possibility of acquiring rights in a ‘family’ of marks, 
but none has upheld such a claim under circumstances even remotely resembling 
those of this case.”65 Additionally, the court stated that the plaintiff’s actual use 
of marks within the family, such as “Juniorettes” and “Spagh-Ettes” along with 
the more popular “Creamettes,” was so minimal and recent that the marks could 
not have achieved significant consumer recognition.66 The court’s holding 
demonstrated that the market dominance of a family was an important factor in 
determining the protection of the family; it also suggested that the use of certain 
marks, such as the “ettes” suffix, was so pervasive both in the culture and in the 
  
 60 Id. at 296. 
 61 Creamette Co. v. Merlino, 299 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1962); see also Spraying Sys. Co. 
v. Delvan Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 395 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding the suffix “jet” for spray 
nozzles is descriptive and not supporting of a family of marks argument, even though 
there was evidence of substantial sales and market share); Am. Standard Inc. v. Scott & 
Fetzer Co., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 457, 461 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (holding the prefix “aqua” 
was highly suggestive for water faucets and thus could not serve as a distinctive feature 
of a family of marks); Servo Corp. of Am. v. Servo-Tex Prods. Co., 289 F.2d 955, 956 
(C.C.P.A. 1961) (holding the prefix “servo” is commonly used in the industry as an 
abbreviation for certain products (servomotors and servomechanisms) and is, therefore, 
descriptive and cannot distinguish a family of marks). 
 62 Creamette. 299 F.2d at 56. 
 63 Id. at 58. 
 64 Id. at 59. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 58. 
 




market that enforcing them as a family mark under § 1052(d) would be 
impossible.67 
While circuit courts, such as the Ninth Circuit in Creamette, threatened to 
marginalize and cast doubt on the family of marks doctrine as a valid legal 
theory, the 1963 decision of the CCPA in Motorola, Inc. v. Griffiths went far to 
redeem it.68 In Motorola, the plaintiff argued it had established a pattern of use 
of “Golden” in the radio and television electronics industries prior to the 
defendant’s proposed mark, “The Golden Grid,” for TV remotes.69 The plaintiff 
made four successful arguments in suggesting the defendant’s new trademark 
would infringe its prior use.70 First, the plaintiff argued that its business in the 
radio and television electronics field had been substantial.71 The plaintiff showed 
that its ninety-eight distributors sold to 23,000 retailers and 25,000 service and 
repair organizations. Second, the plaintiff argued that the value of products sold 
in connection with one or more of its family trademarks was greatthe value of 
the products was in excess of $230 million, with $12 million spent on 
advertising.72 Additionally, the value of replacement parts and components 
bearing the relevant marks was $3 million per year.73 Third, the plaintiff argued 
the period of time over which it sold and marketed its trademarks, prior to the 
defendant’s entry, was substantial: twenty-two years, from 1935–1957.74 And 
finally, plaintiff argued that by the time of the defendant’s first use, the plaintiff 
had already been established in the television receiver industry with several 
“Golden” trademarks.75 The court held, “[w]hether or not the situation is 
categorized as one in which the opposer has a ‘family,’” it was likely that at 
least a substantial number of consumers would attribute origin of the 
defendant’s mark to the plaintiff.76 The court noted that part of the defendant’s 
mark was descriptive (“Grid”).77 However, it also stated that the issue was not 
whether part of the plaintiff’s marks was descriptive, but whether the 
defendant’s mark was likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception as a 
whole.78 The court also noted that there were ten third party registrations that 
used “Golden” in the electronics field, five of which were pertinent.79 
Significantly, and in direct opposition to the prior case law finding concurrent 
  
 67 Id. 
 68 Motorola, Inc. v. Griffiths Elecs. Inc., 317 F.2d 397, 401 (C.C.P.A. 1963). 
 69 Id. at 399. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 400. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
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third party registrations as a significant factor against the existence of a family 
mark, the court stated: “As a matter of logic it would seem to us that if opposer 
has a family of six marks all starting with the non-descriptive word “Golden,” it 
still has that family notwithstanding there may be some others using the same 
word to some undisclosed extent.”80 The court’s holdings that (1) the existence 
of a family mark is consistent with the existence of concurrent third party 
registrations, and (2) the amount, value, volume, and duration of the family 
owner’s business at the time of the defendant’s entry are important factors in 
proving ownership of a family were both significant steps toward the 
development of the family of marks doctrine. 
Two years later, the CCPA reconsidered the doctrine in Polaroid Corp. v. 
Richard Mfg. Co.81 Polaroid argued that its use of the prefix “pola” on a wide 
variety of photographic products had created such public recognition of the 
prefix that its trademarks were entitled to family protection.82 The court signaled 
a retraction from its position in Motorola by clearly addressing Polaroid’s 
argument and dismissing it: 
We agree with the board that the evidence fails to establish that appellant 
has advertised or promoted such marks sufficiently to establish in the mind 
of the public or in the trade a recognition or awareness that it possesses a 
‘family of marks’ identified by the prefix ‘pola’ and that the ownership 
and registration of a number of marks containing this prefix is not 
sufficient to create that exclusivity claimed for the prefix ‘pola,’ per se, 
under the theory advanced.83 
Mere registrations of marks with the common element alone would not support a 
family of marks claim.84 The court emphasized that each case, under a theory of 
likelihood of confusion, must be decided on the facts before the court.85 In 
comparing the defendant’s mark “Poly-vue” with the plaintiff’s marks, including 
“Polacolor,” “Pola-line,” “Polapak,” and “Polachrome,” the court held that the 
striking and distinguishing dissimilarities between the marks prevented any real 
likelihood of confusion.86 They did not look alike to the court, their 
pronunciations were different, and each mark imparted separate and distinct 
connotations.87 
As the case law further developed, the CCPA adopted a more 
standardized approach to family of marks claims.88 In Procter & Gamble Co. v. 
  
 80 Id. 
 81 Polaroid Corp. v. Richard Mfg. Co., 341 F.2d 150 (C.C.P.A. 1965). 
 82 Id. at 152. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
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 88 See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Cohen, 375 F.2d 494 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 




Cohen, the Court established preliminary considerations that must be satisfied to 
apply the doctrine: (1) whether each party to the lawsuit actually owns its marks; 
(2) whether the party asserting the doctrine can actually show priority of use; 
and (3) whether the goods used under each mark are “identical in kind.”89 The 
court went on to hold that Procter & Gamble failed to establish proof that their 
courtesy title marks “Mr.,” “Mrs.,” or “Lady,” in conjunction with words or 
signs having cleaning significance, established family protection.90 The court 
addressed the defendant’s “Mr. Sani-Terry” mark as a whole, including both the 
mark’s name and personified design, which the court considered a vital part of 
the defendant’s mark.91 The court found the design, spelling, and sound of the 
mark distinct enough from the “Mr. Clean” mark that no likelihood of confusion 
was present.92 
C. Family of Marks in Conjunction with Secondary Meaning and Inherent  
Distinctiveness 
In his Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc. opinion of 1976, 
Judge Friendly created a legal framework for what earlier trademark cases called 
inherent distinctiveness, providing an important addition to the family marks 
analysis.93 In Abercrombie, he detailed the spectrum of protectable trademarks 
and stated that a trademark’s registration with the Patent Office afforded a 
rebuttable presumption that the mark is suggestive, arbitrary or fanciful and, 
therefore, sufficiently distinctive to support protection.94 The spectrum of 
trademarks runs from the arbitrary and fanciful, to the suggestive, the 
descriptive, and ultimately the generic, with the first categories being the most 
protectable and the latter categories being the least protectable.95 Distinctiveness 
  
 89 Id. at 496. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. (court doesn’t actually rule on the spelling or the sound). 
 93 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 
1976); see also Dinwoodie, supra note 30, at 482. (“The primary prerequisite to 
trademark protection is proof of a mark’s distinctiveness.”). 
 94 Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11. 
 95 See id. Fanciful or arbitrary trademarks are those “invented solely for their use as 
trademarks,” and are the most inherently distinctive trademarks. Id. at n.12. A suggestive 
trademark is less inherently distinctive, but is still entitled to registration without proof of 
secondary meaning. A trademark is suggestive if it requires “imagination, thought and 
perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of goods.” Id. at 11. A trademark is 
descriptive if it “conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics 
of the goods,” and may not be protected unless the owner can demonstrate secondary 
meaning in the mark. Id. And finally, generic trademarks are not protectable because they 
offer no distinction between the type of good marketed and the proponent’s product; they 
are those that “[refer], or [have] come to be understood as referring, to the genus of which 
the particular product is a species.” Id. at 9. 
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also became important within the context of determining the strength of the 
proponent’s trademark under a likelihood of confusion analysis.96 
Also in the 1970s, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the distinctiveness of the 
proponent’s family mark in terms of whether the mark had acquired secondary 
meaning.97 In Aloe Crème Labs., Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., the Fifth Circuit addressed 
the likelihood that Milsan’s aloe products would be confused with Aloe Crème’s 
family of aloe trademarks, after the latter argued it had established secondary 
meaning in the word “alo.”98 In Milsan, the court noted that the Fifth Circuit had 
adopted a policy of not recognizing secondary meaning in a trademark that 
comprises the common name of a good, because “the recognition of property 
rights in the common name of an article could be tantamount to granting a 
monopoly in that commodity.”99 The Seventh Circuit expanded that prohibition 
to marks that are generic names of an ingredient of the underlying product, but 
the Fifth Circuit declined to adopt this expansive view.100 It instead addressed 
whether “alo” had gained secondary meaning under Aloe Crème’s promotion 
and marketing.101 The court stated that the evidentiary burden necessary to 
establish secondary meaning is substantial where the mark designates a principal 
ingredient of a product desired by the public.102 To provide evidence of 
secondary meaning, the court stated that the proponent must demonstrate that 
the public recognized the particular trademark and associated it with the 
proponent’s brand.103 It held that Aloe Crème had not met its burden to establish 
secondary meaning in its “alo” family of trademarks.104 Although Aloe Crème 
had spent almost $3 million in advertising its aloe products in various 
  
 96 See Sizes Unlimited, Inc. v. Sizes to Fit, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1558, 1561 (E.D.N.Y. 
1994). 
 97 Aloe Crème Labs, Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 850 (5th Cir. 1970) (affirming 
the district court’s finding that “alo” was descriptive and that the plaintiff had not 
demonstrated secondary meaning in the mark). 
 98 Id. at 848–50. Secondary meaning occurs when a company turns a word or term 
that is descriptive of an important aspect of the underlying product into a word the public 
closely associates with the company’s trademark. See id. at 848. What originally was 
only descriptive, on gaining secondary meaning, turns into a “full-fledged trademark.” Id. 
at 848 n.13. The chief inquiry in an analysis of secondary meaning is the attitude of the 
consumer toward the mark and whether it denotes a “single thing coming from a single 
source.” Id. at 849. Relevant considerations include: proof of long-time use of the 
trademark; extensive sales of products under the trademark; and significant advertising or 
promotion. Id. at 850. 
 99 Id. at 849. 
 100 Id.; see also Henry Heide, Inc. v. George Ziegler, Co., 354 F.2d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 
1965) (“Jujubes”); Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg., 343 F.2d 655, 668 (7th 
Cir. 1965) (“yo-yos”). 
 101 Milsan, 423 F.2d at 849–50. 
 102 Id. at 850. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 




publications such as Harpers Bazaar and Vogue, it provided only one witness to 
testify about consumer recognition and secondary meaning, and that witness 
testified that customers had used the term “alo” to refer to aloe products 
generally.105 
However, in Aloe Crème Labs., Inc. v. Aloe 99, Inc., the Trademark Trial 
and Appeal Board (TTAB) held that the proponent had established a family of 
marks in the prefix “alo,” despite the fact that the prefix was a generic name for 
an underlying ingredient.106 The opposer’s long list of “alo” products along with 
the extensive use and advertising of those marks provided sufficient evidence 
that the mark had acquired secondary meaning. It sold its “alo” products 
throughout the United States at leading department and drug stores, with over 
3600 active retail accounts.107 It also utilized newspaper advertisements, 
cooperative agreements with retailers, special sales promotions and displays, 
and spent approximately $5 million dollars on marketing between 1953 and 
1975.108 Its total sales were near $21 million.109 Importantly, the Board noted 
that the very evidence suggesting the “alo” mark had acquired secondary 
meaning through distinctiveness in the marketplace also showed the opposer had 
established a family of marks.110 
D. Seminal Family of Marks Case: McDonald’s Corp. v. McBagel’s, Inc. 
In 1986 the Southern District of New York decided McDonald’s Corp. v. 
McBagel’s, Inc., one of the most important cases for the family of marks 
doctrine.111 McDonald’s Corporation opened its first restaurant in upstate New 
York in 1958 and expanded to several hundred across the state over the next 
twenty years, brought action to enjoin a company called McBagel’s, Inc. and its 
  
 105 Id. 
 106 Aloe Crème Labs., Inc. v. Aloe 99, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 316, 1975 TTAB 
LEXIS 114, at *33–34 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 29, 1975) (holding the difference in spelling 
between “alo” and “aloe” cannot be overlooked in addressing secondary meaning; 
extensive advertising and sales over a reasonable time may “condition” the public to 
recognize the brand over the descriptive term). 
 107 Id. at *12–13. 
 108 Id. at *13. 
 109 Id. at *15. 
 110 See id. *31–35. 
 111 See generally McDonald’s Corp. v. McBagel’s, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986). 
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sole shareholder from using its mark in connection with a bagel bakery and 
restaurant.112 
1.  Background of the Case 
At the time of the lawsuit, McDonald’s held no trade or service mark 
registration for “Mc,” but had registered around thirty-four marks containing 
“Mc” or “Mac.”113 In 1984, McBagel’s opened its restaurant in New York, 
advertising the restaurant locally on radio stations and billboards.114 
McDonald’s’ primary claim in the lawsuit was that McBagel’s infringed its 
family of “Mc” products through a confusingly similar use of “Mc” in a related 
market.115 The court expressed the doctrine particularly well: 
[I]f McDonald’s can demonstrate that it has established a “family of 
marks,” the corporation may obtain trademark protection against one 
whose mark is thought to emanate from the same source as the plaintiff’s 
family. The existence . . . of a family of marks is a question of fact based 
on the distinctiveness of the common formative component and other 
factors, including the extent of the family’s use, advertising, promotion, 
and its inclusion in a number of registered and unregistered marks owned 
by a single party.116 
2. Court’s Holding and Analysis as to Family of Marks Ownership 
The court had “no hesitation” in finding that McDonald’s owned a family 
of both registered and unregistered marks in the “Mc” or “Mac” prefix.117 Some 
of the factors most persuasive to the court included: (1) the existence of 
McDonald’s many mark registrations of the “Mc” or “Mac” prefix for food-
related products (sixteen listed); (2) the “massive” advertising expenditures 
devoted by the company to create recognition for those marks (over one hundred 
different TV commercials run nationally and locally between 1975 and 1986, 
billboards as well as print advertising in national magazines such as Time, 
Newsweek, and Sports Illustrated, and in store promotion at McDonald’s 6,800 
U.S. restaurants); (3) the substantial evidence of independent articles in the 
media about McDonald’s and its prefix, which suggested public awareness; (4) 
  
 112 Id. at 1268. McDonald’s has also actively enforced its “Mc” family mark against 
apparent non-competitors. See, e.g., McDonald’s Corp. v. McKinley, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1895, 1896 (T.T.A.B. 1989) (“McTeddy Bears”); J&J Snack Foods Corp. v. 
McDonald’s Corp., 932 F.2d 1460, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“McPretzels”); McDonald’s 
Corp. v. McClain, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1274, 1275 (T.T.A.B. 1995) (“McLegal 
Services”). 
 113 McDonald’s, 649 F. Supp. at 1270. 
 114 Id. at 1271. 
 115 Id. at 1272. 
 116 Id. 
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the length of time McDonald’s had been using its “Mc” family of marks for food 
items on their menu (over ten years between 1975 and 1986); and (5) the court 
also noted that McDonald’s actively policed its rights in the “Mc” prefix prior to 
McBagel’s’ use.118 
In discussing whether McBagel’s infringed McDonald’s family mark, the 
court stated that McDonald’s need only prove by a preponderance of evidence 
that a likelihood of confusion existed.119 A family mark owner satisfies this 
burden by showing there is an appreciable number of ordinarily prudent 
purchasers who are likely to be misled or confused concerning the origin of the 
other party’s mark.120 Confusion may be of any type, including confusion of 
source, sponsorship, affiliation, connection, or identification.121 The public need 
not actually believe the owner of the family produced the second party’s 
product; the public’s belief that the mark owner sponsored or otherwise 
approved the use of the second mark is enough to show confusion.122 
3. Court’s Holding & Analysis as to Likelihood of Confusion 
In addressing whether likelihood of confusion existed, the McDonald’s 
Court determined that a court must weigh numerous, non-exclusive factors: (1) 
the strength of the owner’s mark; (2) the degree of similarity between the marks; 
(3) the proximity of the products; (4) the likelihood that the prior owner will 
bridge the gap by expanding its product line into the market occupied by the 
defendant; (5) evidence of actual consumer confusion; (6) whether the defendant 
adopted their mark in good faith; (7) the quality of the defendant’s product; (8) 
the sophistication of the buyers; and (9) the relative harm to the parties should 
the court grant or deny the relief requested.123 The court found that a clear 
majority of the nine factors favored McDonald’s (it did not determine the 
relative quality of the goods in question) and concluded “McBagel’s” had 
infringed the “Mc” family mark.124 
  
 118 Id.; see also Emily Grant, Might Makes McRight: McDonald’s Corporation’s 
Trademark Strategy, 19 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 227, 229 (2004). 
 119 McDonald’s, 649 F. Supp. at 1273. 
 120 McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 121 Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971); 
King Research, Inc. v. Shulton, Inc., 454 F.2d 66, 68–69 (2d Cir. 1972); Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 122 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 204. 
 123 Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961); Chandon 
Champagne Corp. v. San Marino Wine Corp., 335 F.2d 531, 536 (2d Cir. 1964). 
 124 McDonald’s, 649 F. Supp. at 1274–79. 
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a. Strength of the Owner’s Mark 
Under the first factor, the court found McDonald’s family mark was 
strong.125 The strength of a family mark is a function of its distinctiveness, or its 
“tendency to identify the goods or services sold under the mark with a particular 
source.”126 Arbitrary marks are stronger than descriptive marks because they are 
easily identified solely with the producer of a particular product or service.127 
Examples include “Dial,” “Sanka,” and “Pepsi.’’128 The court found the “Mc” 
formative was, standing alone, “arbitrary and fanciful” and described nothing; it 
also noted that McDonald’s advertising efforts enhanced its distinctiveness.129 
Additionally, McDonald’s’ successful legal efforts in enforcing the mark gave it 
greater strength.130 In important dicta, the court stated that mere third party 
registrations of “Mc” by themselves do not weaken the McDonald’s family.131 
For third party registrations to provide evidence of the weakness of the 
proponent’s family, the court stated, the defendant would have to demonstrate 
“actual use” of third party registrations by competitors, and a high degree to 
which such a competitor “promot[ed] . . . their marks through advertising.”132 
There was no evidence that third party registrations of “Mc” were actually used 
by McDonald’s’ competitors or that consumers identified such marks with a 
specific product sponsored by such a competitor.133 The court’s finding with 
regard to the strength of McDonald’s family has been echoed in subsequent 
cases filed by McDonald’s to enforce its family: “[McDonald’s ‘Mc’ family 
mark] rank[s] among the strongest marks, enjoying instant recognition among 
virtually all members of our society.”134 
b. Degree of Similarity Between the Marks 
Under the second factor, the court found that the two marks were 
similar.135 The defendant advertised the “McBagel’s” mark prominently in 
newspaper and on the radio and did not differentiate its services from 
  
 125 Id. at 1275. 
 126 Id. at 1274 (citing McGregor, Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 
(2d Cir. 1979)). 
 127 Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 1185, 1197 
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McDonald’s’ services.136 The court noted that the advertising mediums used by 
the parties, as well as the cross sections of the public reached by that advertising, 
were similar.137 Also, differences in trade dress did not dispel any possible 
association between the two companies; the court found that the McBagel’s 
customer could mistakenly believe that McDonald’s had entered the bagel 
market under a slightly different name and style.138 McDonald’s history of 
expansion, as well as the fact that it operates in the same areas within the city 
suggested further similarity.139 Differences between McBagel’s’ and 
McDonald’s’ trade dress within each respective restaurant were not material to 
the extent that the important temporal point of confusion was drawing the 
customer to the store through advertising.140 The consumer, once confused, was 
more likely to make a purchase at McBagel’s even though its trade dress 
differed from McDonald’s.141 
c. Proximity of the Products 
Thirdly, the court found that the respective products were proximate 
because they were marketed in the same industry (restaurant services).142 Both 
marks were used to advertise products in the New York fast food business.143 
The fact that the services at each respective restaurant were not precisely the 
same (burgers and fries compared with a bagel bakery) was immaterial.144 Even 
if the services were found to be different but closely related, the court noted, 
McDonald’s would still be entitled to protection.”145 Both the similarity of the 
parties’ businesses and McDonald’s’ history of expansion, suggested the 
products and services were sufficiently proximate because any consumer could 
reasonably believe McDonald’s sponsored McBagel’s.146 Subsequent courts 
have held that even where the markets of the respective products are not 
  
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. (One of the plaintiff’s witnesses testified that the market to which each business 
was directed included “anyone with a stomach.”). 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 1276. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id.; see also Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928) 
(“[A] merchant may have a sufficient economic interest in the use of his mark outside the 
field of his own exploitation to justify interposition by a court . . . [i]f another uses it, he 
borrows the owner’s reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his control.”). 
 145 McDonald’s, 649 F. Supp. at 1276 (holding trademark owner is entitled to 
protection from confusion not only with the specific type of product it markets, but also 
with any closely related products that consumers could reasonably believe were produced 
or sponsored by the family mark owner). 
 146 Id. 
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proximate, McDonald’s could still enforce its family mark where “an 
appreciable number of the public [is likely] to be confused by believing [the 
opposed’s product] is sponsored, associated, affiliated, connected, or endorsed 
by McDonald’s.”147 
d. Likelihood of Expansion 
Additionally, the court found that based on McDonald’s history and 
growth, there was a distinct possibility that McDonald’s would expand its 
product line to include bagels.148 Substantial probative evidence established that 
McDonald’s had an ongoing program to test new products, and sold bagels 
under this program.149 
e. Evidence of Actual Consumer Confusion 
Under the fifth factor, the court reasoned that, although evidence of actual 
confusion is not essential, any evidence of actual confusion is highly persuasive 
in proving confusion.150 The court found evidence of “substantial actual 
confusion,” based on testimony by a McBagel’s manager suggesting he received 
inquiries from customers concerning whether McDonald’s was going into the 
bagel business, as well as on the results of two independent national and local 
surveys.151 Nearly one out of four people (24.8%) in the national survey and one 
out of three people (36.4%) in the state survey believed that McDonald’s 
sponsored McBagel’s.152 The major reason given by the survey participants for 
believing in the sponsorship was the use of “Mc” in McBagel’s’ name.153 In 
subsequent cases where the products were sold in different markets, the actual 
  
 147 Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 221 (holding the 
opposed’s trademark “MCSLEEP” used in promoting its motel business was a business 
operating outside the food industry, but which infringed McDonald’s family mark under 
a likelihood of confusion analysis). 
 148 McDonald’s, 649 F. Supp. at 1277. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. Of the respondents, roughly one out of four nationally and one out of three in 
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confusion was required to be more than insignificant to support a finding of 
infringement.154 
f. Good Faith 
Under the sixth factor, the court determined that the defendants had acted 
in less than good faith by adopting the “McBagel’s” mark.155 The court made 
this determination after discrediting the defendant’s story of how the mark was 
chosen.156 It found the story uncorroborated, implausible, and discredited after 
observing the owner of McBagel’s on the witness stand.157 This finding was 
further reinforced by the fact that McBagel’s advertised a new food item called 
the “Mc (stuffed) Bagel” after McDonald’s had filed its action.158 The court 
found McBagel’s had attempted to exploit notoriety from the litigation by 
promoting this item and had, therefore, acted in bad faith.159 
g. Relative Quality of the Products 
Under the seventh factor, the court found that it need not resolve the 
question of which company’s product was superior.160 A prior owner should not 
be subjected to the risk that the public perception of the product will suffer if 
associated with a product of inferior quality; however, this factor was not 
essential to the court’s holding.161 
h. Sophistication of the Consumers 
The court did determine that where buyers are unsophisticated or make 
their decisions quickly and casually, the likelihood of confusion increases.162 
The court’s position was that consumers in the fast food market do not make 
sophisticated restaurant choices and instead make decisions quickly and casually 
(don’t tell this to fans of In-N-Out).163 Based on finding each factor in favor of 
McDonald’s and likelihood of confusion (excluding a determination of the 
  
 154 McDonald’s Corp. v. Shop At Home, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 801, 810 (M.D. Tenn. 
2000) (Even though the potential pool for confused McDonald’s customers was 
enormous, the production of sixteen phone calls suggesting actual consumer confusion 
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 155 McDonald’s, 649 F. Supp. at 1278. 
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seventh factor), the court held McBagel’s’ infringement warranted an 
injunction.164 
i. Balance of Hardships in Consideration of Proper Remedy 
The court balanced the relative hardships to the parties and determined 
that because McBagel’s had made its business investments subsequent to the 
litigation with knowledge that use of the mark might have to be discontinued, 
this favored granting McDonald’s an injunction.165 The court framed the 
appropriate injunctive relief by prohibiting the defendant from using “Mc” 
solely in combination with a “generic food item”; the defendant was free to use 
the “Mc” prefix if he chose his full name as his trademark, making his mark 
more arbitrary under Judge Friendly’s analysis.166 The court noted that 
McDonald’s did not have a “boundless monopoly” over the mark,167 but, instead, 
McDonald’s was entitled to rights to the “Mc” family that bore a relation to the 
manner in which it was used to promote its business.168 
E. Later Cases 
As the case law further developed around the strong analysis exemplified 
by the Southern District of New York in McDonald’s, courts became more 
comfortable granting summary judgment, as well as preliminary and permanent 
injunctions predicated on family of marks arguments.169 For example, in Soltex 
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 165 Id. (“This is not a case where an injunction will unfairly disadvantage a second user 
who has expended considerable sums to promote his trademark before the first user 
raised the issue of infringement.”). 
 166 Id. at 1282. 
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 169 See Int’l Diagnostic Tech., Inc. v. Miles Labs., Inc., 746 F.2d 798, 800 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (finding a likelihood of confusion where the family mark “STIX” was strikingly 
similar to defendant’s “STIQ” in sound, appearance, and connotation; both products were 
marketed in the same industry and could be used as complementary tests); E. & J. Gallo 
Winery v. Consorzio del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 457, 471 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding 
defendant had infringed plaintiff’s family as a matter of law and plaintiff was entitled to 
summary judgment); Sizes Unlimited, Inc. v. Sizes to Fit, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1558, 1567 
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding plaintiff had not shown their unregistered “Sizes” family had 
acquired secondary meaning and its motion for an injunction was denied); Champagne 
Louis Roederer, S.A. v. Delicato Vineyards, 148 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(upholding the lower court’s decision that the dissimilarity of the marks was dispositive 
of the issue of likelihood of confusion, even though many of the other factors favored the 
plaintiff; one factor alone may be dispositive especially when it is dissimilarity); 
Lucasfilm Ltd., v. Media Market Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 901 (N.D. Cal. 2002) 
(finding that while parody is not a defense against infringement, it is relevant in showing 
there is little likelihood of confusion); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Caught-On-Bleu, Inc., 
 
 




Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Industries, Inc., the Second Circuit held a district court 
has discretion to fashion injunctive relief commensurate with the extent of the 
defendant’s infringement.170 Given the fact that the defendant sold its infringing 
mark in the raw plastic market and the plaintiff sold its family of marks in 
finished plastic, the court reasoned that requiring the defendant to use a 
disclaimer to expressly differentiate the two marks was appropriate.171 However, 
in E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., the court decided against the use of 
such a disclaimer.172 The court felt that based on the findings of a national 
survey, such a disclaimer would not be effective in protecting against likelihood 
of confusion, and would actually further dilute the plaintiff’s trademark.173 The 
court determined that such dilution would constitute irreparable injury and, 
therefore, held that the plaintiff was entitled to a permanent injunction.174 
Additionally, in Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., the court 
denied each party’s motion for summary judgment because under the Polaroid 
factors,175 although Levi’s demonstrated strength in its “501” family, factual 
disputes existed as to whether it was similar to Jordache’s “Jordache Basics 
101” mark.176 In contrast, the Federal Circuit, in Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-
Culver Co., was willing to grant summary judgment under the Polaroid 
factors.177 In that case, the dispositive factors included “the similarity of the 
marks” and “the relatedness of the goods.”178 
F. The Family of Marks Doctrine Today 
The Federal Circuit defined the family mark as “a group of marks having 
a recognizable common characteristic, wherein the marks are composed and 
used in such a way that the public associates not only the individual marks, but 
the common characteristic of the family, with the trademark owner.”179 When 
  
288 F. Supp. 2d 105, 124 (D.N.H. 2003) (holding plaintiff was entitled to summary 
judgment under a claim for infringement against its “Bud” family even though there was 
a factual dispute as to the defendant’s intent in using its “Billy Budd” mark). 
 170 Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 1325, 1330 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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 175 Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (setting 
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F. Supp. 1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)). 
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the trademark owner has a family of protectable marks that consumers 
recognize, courts find that the owner has developed “goodwill” in the protection 
of the overall family.180 There are three clear policy justifications for protecting 
such families: (1) the senior user’s interest in being able to enter a related field 
at some future time; (2) the senior user’s interest in protecting the good 
reputation associated with his mark from the inferior merchandise of the junior 
user; and (3) the public’s interest in not being misled by a confusingly similar 
mark.181 
The doctrine must be asserted within a claim of likelihood of confusion, 
under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), and, therefore, cannot be asserted as a stand-alone 
claim.182 It may be asserted either to bar registration of a confusingly similar 
mark or to assert a claim for trademark infringement.183 In deciding questions of 
likelihood of confusion, a court will place itself “in a position of an average 
purchaser or prospective purchaser in an attempt to understand what the normal 
reaction would be to the marks as they are encountered in the marketplace.”184 
An infringing use may be found both in the opposer’s own particular market as 
well as outside of the opposer’s market if the likelihood of confusion is 
particularly high: 
The owner of a mark who has developed a reputation and identity with a 
mark through his products, service, marketing, and presence in the market, 
has an interest in protecting the business and reputation for which the mark 
stands, not only at the present time in the current markets in which he does 
business, but for future times and in related markets that the development 
of his business might naturally take him. The extent to which he may 
protect this interest relates directly to the strength of his mark. While one 
mark may not enjoy the strength of identity to preclude use of a junior 
mark in a related field or neighboring market, another may enjoy such 
recognition that confusion might result outside his own field or beyond the 
markets in which he does business. The measurement of this strength is 
revealed by evidence demonstrating a likelihood of confusion.185 
  
 180 Id. at 1462–63. 
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An analysis of the family of marks doctrine today proceeds essentially on 
two levels.186 First, the proponent must demonstrate that they are entitled to 
protection of a family mark as a result of recurrent use of the common 
formative, which is reinforced by consumer recognition.187 Second, the 
proponent must show that an opponent’s mark—whether having been registered 
or proposed to be registered—presents a likelihood that an ordinary consumer 
who encountered it could reasonably believe that it originated from or was 
sponsored by the proponent.188 
1. Proving Ownership of a Family Mark 
Under the first level of the analysis, the proponent must provide evidence 
of prior registrations or use of a number of marks that share a common 
characteristic or formative.189 In Motorola, Inc. v. Griffiths Elecs., Inc., the 
proponent provided evidence of the registration of six marks with “‘GOLDEN’” 
in the title, which the court found was enough to entitle the proponent to 
protection.190 In Aloe Crème Labs., Inc. v. Aloe 99, Inc., Aloe Crème Labs. 
provided evidence of registration or prior use of over eighteen marks that used 
the “ALO” formative.191 McDonald’s provided evidence of over fifteen different 
registrations of “Mc” or “Mac.” E. & J. Gallo Winery listed only four 
registrations in their complaint but provided evidence of over ten total 
registrations of “Gallo.”192 
After showing that the proponent has a number of marks that all share a 
common element or formative, the proponent must show that the family mark is 
sufficiently distinct to warrant protection.193 The formative must not be the final 
syllable of common words or be a generic term for the underlying product.194 
Courts will analyze the distinctiveness of the proponent’s family mark by 
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placing it somewhere on Judge Friendly’s Abercrombie spectrum.195 Fanciful or 
arbitrary marks are invented solely for their use as trademarks and are entitled to 
protection without the proponent’s demonstration of secondary meaning.196 
Suggestive marks require imagination, thought or perception to reach the nature 
of the goods and are entitled to protection without proof of secondary meaning 
as well.197 Descriptive marks, in contrast, convey an immediate idea of the 
ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods; they may be entitled to 
protection only after the proponent has demonstrated secondary meaning.198 
Generic marks either refer or have come to refer to the type of product sold, and 
are generally not entitled to protection.199 Where the family mark is found 
descriptive, it may still be entitled to protection if the proponent provides 
evidence that the mark has gained secondary meaning in the marketplace.200 
In conjunction with demonstrating the existence of the common formative 
and establishing its distinctiveness, the proponent must also prove that such 
prior registration or use is not recent or insignificant.201 Courts generally look to 
four factors to determine the extensiveness of the proponent’s use and to 
measure consumer recognition (this is substantially the same inquiry a court 
makes in analyzing whether the proponent has created secondary meaning202): 
(1) the substantiality of business through which the family is marketed; (2) the 
value of the products sold within the family; (3) the period of time over which 
the proponent has marketed the family; and (4) whether the proponent is well 
established in the industry at the time of the defendant’s entry.203 The more the 
proponent spends on advertising for an extended period, and the greater the 
indication of actual consumer recognition of the family, the more likely the 
court will be to protect the proponent’s family.204 
Finally under the first level of analysis, the proponent must avoid 
ancillary considerations such as numerous third party registrations of the 
formative in the pertinent industry or the possibility that the defendant’s mark is 
different enough from the proponent’s so that the court does not proceed to an 
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analysis of the likelihood of confusion.205 Mere third party registrations alone, 
however, will not be enough to bar protection of the family.206 For third party 
registrations to matter and potentially bar protection, they must be registered and 
actually used in more than an insignificant way by the proponent’s competitors; 
additionally, there must be actual consumer recognition of such third party 
registrations.207 
2. Demonstrating a Likelihood of Confusion 
Under the second level of analysis and after having demonstrated a 
protectable family mark, the proponent must then demonstrate that the 
defendant’s mark presents a likelihood of confusion.208 Whereas the first level of 
analysis focuses on the proponent’s mark alone and the corresponding business 
and consumer recognition supporting it, the second level of analysis explicitly 
compares the proponent’s family to the defendant’s mark.209 The factors the 
court weighs in the second level of analysis are the factors expressed by the 
Southern District of New York in McDonald’s: (1) the strength of the owner’s 
mark; (2) the degree of similarity between the marks; (3) the proximity of the 
products; (4) the likelihood that the prior owner will expand; (5) evidence of 
actual consumer confusion; (6) whether the defendant adopted their mark in 
good faith; (7) the relative quality of the products; (8) the sophistication of the 
buyers; and (9) the relative harm to the parties should the court grant or deny the 
relief requested.210 
II. HOW THE FAMILY OF MARKS DOCTRINE BENEFITS APPLE 
Applying the foregoing case law to three hypotheticals will demonstrate 
more clearly how Apple may use the doctrine. The succeeding hypotheticals are 
fictitious and range from situations in which a court is least likely to find a 
likelihood of confusion to those in which a court is most likely. Although these 
examples are fictitious, real world examples exist of companies using the “i” 
prefix to directly or indirectly benefit from the goodwill Apple has created in the 
“i” mark including: iHome’s consumer electronic products211 and BMW’s 
concept car series including iDrive i8 and i3 cars.212 Important questions of legal 
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strategy remain for Apple in the wake of increasing commercial use of the “i” 
prefix among larger and more powerful companies such as BMW. While 
BMW’s actual use of the prefix remains deferred because it is being applied to a 
line of future concept cars that have yet to be brought to market, such emerging 
uses threaten to dilute consumer association with Apple’s ownership and use. If 
Apple were to fail to vigorously defend its right to use the prefix, contrasting 
with McDonald’s active use of the doctrine in the 1980s and 90s, Apple will 
passively accept such potentially infringing commercial uses. This strategy may 
inhibit any future attempts Apple may take to protect its family. Therefore, to 
protect the providence of its brand, Apple should take a more active role in 
policing its line of “i” products by resorting to the family of marks doctrine. 
The following chart provides information demonstrating Apple’s 
dominance in the tech market and establishes that Apple has a market position in 
the consumer technology industry similar to that of McDonald’s in the late 
1980s and early 1990s in the fast food industry. Apple’s yearly revenue and 
yearly advertising expenses are directly relevant in proving to a court that it has 
demonstrable goodwill in the “i” family prefix. 
 







1998 iMac  $5,941 million 
1999 iMovie  $6,134 million 
1999 iPhoto (iLife Suite)  $6,134 million 
   2000214    
2001 iPod  $5,363 million 
2003 iTunes  $6,207 million 
2007 iPhone $467 million $24,578 million 
2010 iPad $691 million $65,225 million 
2011 iCloud $933 million $108 billion 
2012 iBooks Textbooks $1 billion $156 billion 
To put these numbers in the context of a possible family marks argument 
for Apple, McDonald’s had sixteen “Mc” or “Mac” trademarks at the time of its 
litigation with McBagels.215 As of 2013, Apple has at least twenty trademarks 
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bearing the “i” mark (including second and third generation versions).216 
McDonald’s ran around 100 national and local TV commercials in 1986 and 
also ran ads in print advertising and in national magazines.217 Between 2006 and 
2009, Apple ran a highly successful national TV commercial campaign entitled 
“Get a Mac,” in which two actors used the memorable lines, “I’m a Mac” and 
“I’m a PC,” in effort to personify the relative styles between Macs and PCs, as 
well as between Mac and PC users.218 With this ad campaign alone, Apple ran 
over sixty ads in the United States, thirty-two ads over the internet, fifteen ads in 
the United Kingdom, and twelve ads in Japan.219 Media analysts characterize the 
“Get a Mac” campaign as “effective” because one month after its release 
200,000 more Macs were sold, with an overall increase in the number of Macs 
sold in the first year of the campaign of 39%.220 In addition to the spike in Mac 
sales, there are other indicia of the ad campaign’s effect on the culture and 
corresponding consumer recognition as it was criticized in third party 
periodicals and parodied both on national television and on the internet.221 
Additionally, whereas McDonald’s had used its “Mc” mark for ten years at the 
time of its suit, Apple has currently used the “i” mark for fifteen years.222 
Finally, whereas McDonald’s spent between $350 and $400 million in 
advertising in 1986 with corresponding revenues of between $2.5 and $3 billion, 
Apple spent roughly $1 billion in advertising in 2012 with corresponding 
revenues of $156 billion.223 All of Apple’s astronomical numbers suggest 
consumer recognition at least on par with, and likely drastically exceeding, 
McDonald’s circa 1986. The one factor that McDonald’s had in its favor going 
into its litigation with McBagels that Apple will not have in any near litigation is 
the fact that McDonald’s was active in policing its “Mc” marks.224 In order to 
fully place itself in a position akin to McDonald’s, Apple should consider 
becoming more active in protecting its mark. 
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A. Hypothetical #1: iBoat 
A new boating company, Shanghai Pirates, has just come out with a 
revolutionary concept for a boat that borrows from the simplicity and sleekness 
of modern design and technology.225 The hull is reinforced titanium and the top 
deck is a mixture of organic wood and metal. It has a complex internal computer 
that provides GPS navigation on the water and can auto pilot the boat in case of 
leisure or emergency. It also boasts its ability to connect to the internet 
anywhere on the sea so that travelers will never be out of contact with the 
mainland, and the internet connection provides a direct link to communication 
sites in case the pilot of the ship needs to send a message for help. Designers 
were thinking of calling the boat “Titanic part deux,” but instead settled on 
iBoat. While the boat has been in the planning stages for a while, the company 
did not immediately register the trademark and instead waited until the debut of 
the prototype in June 2012. When the company introduced the boat to the 
market and began vigorously advertising it, Apple, Inc. brought suit for 
trademark infringement asserting a family of marks claim under likelihood of 
confusion. Shanghai Pirates had already taken out ads in major newspapers such 
as the New York Times and print publications such as Time, Newsweek, and 
Vogue. Shanghai Pirates had also advertised on billboards, in boating stores and 
showrooms, and on the radio. Apple conducted an independent national survey 
that found four out of ten people surveyed asked if Apple had gone into boating. 
Apple also gained evidence from the depositions of boating showroom owners 
that customers had called inquiring about the boat and asked if Apple was 
associated with it. Shanghai Pirates received notice of the litigation and, having 
already spent a large amount on advertising the boat, decided to continue to 
advertise it under the “iBoat” trademark. What should the court’s result be given 
the foregoing case law and analysis? 
The court will proceed to analyze Apple’s claim of trademark 
infringement against Shanghai by first determining whether Apple owns a 
family mark in the “i” prefix and then determining whether Shanghai’s mark 
presents a likelihood of consumer confusion. Under the first level of analysis 
Apple must show: (1) that it has a number of prior registrations or uses of “i” 
marks such that it is possible that the public recognizes the “i” family; (2) that 
its family mark is distinctive enough to warrant protection; (3) that its use of the 
family has been substantial resulting in consumer recognition; and (4) that the 
defendant’s mark is similar enough to Apple’s to proceed to a likelihood of 
confusion analysis, and Apple must show that there are not numerous third party 
registrations suggesting a bar on protection.226 
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Apple will likely be able to satisfy the first element because its number of 
“i” products is enough to qualify for family protection. Courts have accepted 
that a company has established a family with evidence of as few as six 
registrations with a common formative.227 Apple has twenty-six registered marks 
bearing the “i” prefix.228 This would place Apple in a similar category to 
McDonald’s, who had over twenty registrations of the “Mc” or “Mac” prefix at 
the time of its litigation with McBagels.229 
Under the second element, Apple may have a more difficult time arguing 
for the distinctiveness of its family. The court will address the distinctiveness of 
Apple’s “i” prefix family by placing it somewhere on Judge Friendly’s spectrum 
of trademark distinctiveness: arbitrary/fanciful, suggestive, descriptive, or 
generic.230 Because most of Apple’s “i” products involve computer technology 
equipment, which has a high association to the internet, it is arguable whether 
the “i” prefix is descriptive for use on the internet. If this is true, Shanghai could 
argue that the “i” mark is not entitled to protection, because, under Judge 
Friendly’s test, the “i” mark conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients, 
qualities, or characteristics of the goods.231 Apple may counter, however, that it 
is not necessarily the case that the “i” prefix is meant to denote use on the 
internet. Its initial iPod format was simply a media player that played mp3 files 
and did not have free access to the internet. That product was one of Apple’s 
first with the “i” prefix and was not linked necessarily to the internet and was 
also a tremendous success.232 Other products such as iLife and iDVD pertain to 
computer applications or software and also do not have an immediate relation to 
the internet. Thus, Apple may argue that the “i” family mark is suggestive 
because it requires imagination, thought or perception to reach the nature of the 
goods from reading the “i” prefix in conjunction with the rest of the mark.233 
However, whether the “i” family is suggestive or descriptive under Judge 
Friendly’s test may not ultimately matter in a full analysis of the family mark’s 
distinctiveness. Even when a family mark is descriptive it may be entitled to 
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protection if the proponent demonstrates secondary meaning in the mark.234 
Courts address substantially the same factors to determine secondary meaning as 
they do in determining consumer recognition for purposes of family mark 
protection.235 This is to say that, even if Apple’s “i” family is found to be 
descriptive, Apple has likely achieved secondary meaning in the marketplace 
and, therefore, qualifies for protection of its family of “i” marks. 
Under the third element, Apple will be able to demonstrate that its use of 
the “i” family has been substantial, and, therefore, there is measurable consumer 
recognition of the mark. Courts look to four factors to determine substantiality 
of use: (1) the amount of business through which the family is marketed; (2) the 
value of the products sold under the family mark; (3) the period of time over 
which the proponent has marketed the family; and (4) whether the proponent is 
well established in the industry at the time of the defendant’s entry.236 
Under the first factor, Apple does a considerable amount of business 
under its “i” related products. In weighing the amount of business done under 
the family mark, courts look to the number of distributors, retailers, and service 
organizations that handle the goods.237 In the Motorola case, the court found that 
Motorola “sells through 98 distributors who sell, in turn, to more than 23,000 
retailers and about 25,000 service and repair organizations,” and concluded that 
those figures support a finding of substantial business done under the family.238 
In McDonald’s, 9,000 restaurants suggested substantial business.239 Apple has 
nearly 400 Apple Stores in 14 different countries, over 250 of which are in the 
United States.240 In addition, there are thousands of authorized Apple retailers 
worldwide, including Verizon, Sprint, Best Buy, and Target. Therefore, under 
the Motorola and McDonald’s standards, Apple conducts a sufficient amount of 
business under the family mark. 
Under the second factor, the value of the products sold under Apple’s “i” 
family is great. In Motorola and McDonald’s, revenues of $230 million and $2.5 
billion, respectively, supported family protection.241 Apple has sold over 300 
million iPods since its launch ten years ago, with a corresponding 78% market 
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share in the music market.242 While Apple has lost market share to Google’s 
Android phones, the iPhone is still at a 33.4% market share in the cell phone 
industry.243 This suggests that one out of three cell phones sold is an iPhone. Its 
iPad market share has “slipped” to 50%, as it has only shipped a measly 14 
million iPads worldwide from July to September of this year.244 This would 
suggest that Apple ships roughly 50 million iPads per year. For the 2011 fiscal 
year, Apple reported revenue of $108.25 billion and net profit of $14.01 
billion.245 Apple’s main “i” products—iPod, iPhone, iPad, and iTunes—
accounted for 75% of its revenue, or roughly $10.5 billion in net profits.246 The 
value of only four of Apple’s twenty-six “i” products was, in 2011, five times 
that of the amount of McDonald’s’ revenue that supported family protection 
when McDonald’s sued to enforce its family mark against McBagel’s. 
Therefore, the value of Apple’s “i” products weighs in favor of protecting the 
family. 
The third factor, the length of time over which Apple has promoted its 
family, also weighs in favor of family protection. In Motorola, the plaintiff’s 
first registration of a mark with the “GOLDEN” formative was in 1935, it 
registered subsequent marks in 1947, 1948, 1955, 1956, and 1957, and it 
brought suit in 1963. McDonald’s first began using the “McMuffin” mark in 
1968 and the “McNuggets” mark in 1979, it initially began using the 
“McDonald’s” mark in the late 1950s, and it brought suit in 1986.247 Apple 
launched its first “i” product in 1998 with the iMac G3.248 It launched its iBook 
product the following year and the first generation iPod in 2001.249 Apple has 
been vigorously marketing its “i” family of products since 1998 and has steadily 
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created consumer recognition in the mark over the last fifteen years. This is a 
similar amount of time to the roughly twenty years over which McDonald’s 
created its family at the time of its lawsuit against McBagel’s. Therefore, 
because the fifteen-year period over which Apple has created and developed its 
“i” family mark is substantial, this factor weighs in favor of family protection. 
Under the fourth factor, Apple is well-established in the technology 
industry at the time of Shanghai’s entry. Courts look to the extent of the 
proponent’s advertising, as well as evidence indicating consumer recognition of 
the family to determine the extent to which the proponent is established.250 In 
Motorola, the proponent spent $12 million in advertising over a period of 
roughly twenty years.251 In McDonald’s, McDonald’s and its licensees spent 
over $300 million in advertising (national and local television, radio, newspaper, 
magazine, billboard, etc.) in 1984 and $350 million in 1985.252 Additionally, 
there were indications of consumer recognition outside McDonald’s advertising 
in the form of independently-created articles and stories in the media.253 Such 
independent articles that focused on the formative itself implied a deep 
awareness in the culture of the derivation of the mark. Surpassing McDonald’s’ 
advertising and marketing expenditures, Apple has spent well over $300 million 
in advertising in recent years.254 It spent $467 million in 2007, $691 million in 
2010, and $933 million in 2011.255 These numbers far exceed the $350 million 
McDonald’s spent on advertising in 1985, which was persuasive to the court in 
finding that McDonald’s had a protectable family mark. Additionally, Apple 
may provide numerous independent news sources focusing on its “i” products 
and its “i” mark in particular. Examples include: “16 Wacky Apple Products 
You Can Only Imagine.”256 “Apple’s Next Product,”257 and “Jobs Says Apple’s 
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“i” Products Score.”258 These news articles, and the many others like them, 
derive meaning because the public recognizes Apple’s “i” prefix. Therefore, 
both Apple’s extremely high expenditures in advertising and the evidence of 
independent news articles suggesting public awareness of the “i” mark 
demonstrates that Apple’s mark is well-established in the market. Because all 
four factors of the third element weigh in favor of finding that Apple’s use of the 
family has been substantial, Apple will demonstrate consumer recognition. 
Under the fourth element, Apple may run into difficulty. While a 
company may demonstrate entitlement to family protection, the defendant may 
argue that the existence of many third party registrations suggests that the 
proponent is not entitled to enforce the family mark.259 Third party registrations, 
however, must be actually used by competitors, and there must be some 
evidence of consumer recognition in the competitor’s mark to weaken the 
proponent’s protection.260 With respect to Apple, there are third party 
registrations or uses in the technology industry of “i” products.261 For example, 
iHome markets speakers in the technology industry under that mark, and iHome 
is not an Apple product. There are other examples that reinforce this argument, 
such as Sony’s software registration using the “i” prefix.262 However, Apple has 
a strong counter to this argument. Although third party registrations do exist, 
Apple may argue that they are either promoted by non-competitors or not 
actually used. In the case of Sony, that company no longer actively markets its 
“i” software. In the case of iHome, that company cannot really be considered a 
competitor of Apple’s because its goods are meant to be compatible and are 
used for non-competing purposes. Additionally, Apple and iHome exist at two 
very different ends of the technology market and, while they may appeal to a 
similar consumer, they do so for different reasons. Apple appeals because of the 
quality of its goods and because of the strength of its brand, whereas iHome 
appeals because its products are cheap, may be used in conjunction with Apple 
products, and because iHome derives a certain goodwill from the “i” mark that 
Apple made successful. Therefore, because such registrations cannot be said to 
be marketed by Apple competitors, a court will likely look beyond these 
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examples in protecting Apple’s family. Additionally, because of the simplicity 
of the “i” formative, a court is likely to find any subsequent company’s use of 
the “i” prefix to be similar enough to Apple’s to proceed to an analysis of the 
likelihood of confusion. As Learned Hand pointed out, just because a potential 
infringer uses its mark in a different market does not mean it is shielded from an 
action for infringement.263 
An argument may be made that, because the “i” prefix has become so 
pervasive, both in the culture and in the market, Apple cannot enforce the “i” 
prefix as a family mark because it has entered into the cultural property of our 
society.264 Shanghai would have to argue that the use of the “i” prefix for all 
things internet-related has become ubiquitous in the culture such that the mark 
has become synonymous with an internet good. Using the holding in Merlino, 
Shanghai would have to argue that the “i” prefix has become as ubiquitous as 
the use of the “ettes” suffix for diminutives.265 There is some support for this 
argument in our culture.266 Practically every type of good you can think of is 
being marketed somewhere under the “i” prefix in attempt to usurp some of the 
mark’s goodwill. However, this argument is ultimately harder to prove than 
third party registrations because it forces the judge to make an estimation as to 
the ubiquity of the use of the mark. While the “i” mark is tremendously popular 
right now, that popularity may have little to do with the fact that the mark is 
somehow cultural property, as is the French diminutive “ettes,” and more to do 
with the fantastic success of the mark due to Apple’s efforts in creating 
consumer recognition. Ultimately, this type of argument must be addressed from 
the standpoint of causation. Is the original user using a mark, or part of a mark, 
that has already been widely used in the culture before the use in 
questionsimilarly to the presence of “ettes” in the culture before Creamettes 
sought to enforce its family based on that suffix. If, instead, the mark was not 
widely used and the popularity of use can only reasonably be determined as 
deriving from the original user’s secondary meaning and goodwill, then the 
judge should enforce a family of marks argument. The popularity of the mark 
that a company has legitimately created based upon that company’s market 
success is exactly the intellectual property that the family of marks doctrine is 
meant to protect. Here, it seems as though the popularity of the “i” prefix derives 
from Apple’s efforts at making the “i” prefix popular and not from any pre-
existing popularity in the culture. Therefore, courts should recognize the 
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significant efforts Apple has made to develop the popularity of its marks and the 
corresponding consumer recognition achieved, and should protect Apple’s use. 
Because a court will likely find that Apple has a protectable family mark, 
it will then proceed to the second level of analysis, which is to determine 
whether Shanghai’s “iBoat” presents a likelihood of confusion. To do so, the 
court will weigh the McDonald’s factors: (1) the strength of the owner’s mark; 
(2) the degree of similarity between the marks; (3) the proximity of the products; 
(4) the likelihood that the prior owner will expand; (5) evidence of actual 
consumer confusion; (6) whether the defendant adopted their mark in good faith; 
(7) the relative quality of the products; (8) the sophistication of the buyers; and 
(9) the relative harm to the parties should the court grant or deny the relief 
requested.267 
The strength of Apple’s mark favors a finding of a likelihood of 
confusion. Strength is “a function of its distinctiveness, or its tendency to 
identify the goods or services sold under the mark with a particular source.”268 
Courts measure strength both in terms of the mark’s distinctiveness on Judge 
Friendly’s spectrum and in terms of whether the mark has gained distinctiveness 
through the proponent’s marketing efforts or promotion.269 McDonald’s’ 
“massive” advertising efforts enhanced the distinctiveness of its “Mc” family.270 
Here, Apple’s mark, as stated above, is likely either suggestive or descriptive, 
using Friendly’s definitions. If the mark is suggestive it is considered distinctive 
and strong without Apple’s showing that it has gained secondary meaning. So, if 
the court finds that the “i” mark is suggestive, this alone would result in a 
finding that it is strong. But even if the court finds the “i” mark descriptive, 
Apple’s massive $900 million advertising campaign in 2011 to promote its 
products places it in that upper echelon of companies whose efforts directly 
translate into consumer recognition. Also, the independent media articles 
referencing Apple’s “i” mark suggest that Apple’s promotion has become 
successful and that its “i” family mark is known. Therefore, regardless of 
whether Apple’s “i” family is found to be suggestive or descriptive, Apple has 
created enough secondary meaning in the “i” mark to warrant a finding that the 
mark is strong. Shanghai may point to the ubiquity of use of the mark among 
third parties to argue under Merlino that such a mark that has entered the 
cultural lexicon is not strong within the meaning of the McDonald’s factors. But 
to the extent that such an argument assumes the popularity created in the mark 
as being already present in the culture, it denies the reality that such popularity 
is the result of Apple’s efforts. Therefore, Apple’s use and success under the 
mark should be respected and the goodwill surrounding the mark should be 
considered Apple’s property. 
  
 267 McDonald’s Corp. v. McBagel’s, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268, 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 268 McGregor, Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 269 McDonald’s, 649 F. Supp. at 1274. 
 270 Id. 
All Together Now: The Family of Marks 





The similarity of Apple’s and Shanghai’s marks also favors a finding of 
confusion. Similarity is a function of whether the marks are similar in isolation 
and whether the advertising of the marks does nothing to distinguish that 
similarity.271 The court in McDonald’s found McBagel’s’ mark similar to the 
McDonald’s mark in isolation and found that the way the defendant advertised 
its restaurant and bagels in newspapers, on the radio, and at the restaurant itself, 
enhanced the similarities between the companies.272 The offending mark 
featured prominently in all three mediums and nothing printed eliminated the 
possibility that McDonald’s sponsored the defendant’s business.273 Here, 
Apple’s family mark is the “i” prefix, which is then applied to a specific product 
(usually technological). Shanghai’s mark is also the “i” prefix, which it attaches 
to the word “boat.” Although Apple has not marketed boats before, the fact that 
this boat is also highly technological increases the similarity between the marks. 
Additionally, Shanghai advertised its mark nationally in high profile 
publications that are the same publications Apple has used to market its goods; 
Shanghai also did nothing to distinguish their mark or goods from Apple’s 
family of “i” marks in their advertisements. Such advertisements will also reach 
a similar cross section of the public—the cross section who reads such 
publications and who is influenced by such advertising—which further suggests 
the similarity of the marks. Therefore, the court will likely find the marks 
similar. 
The proximity of the products may actually hurt Apple, however. 
Proximity is determined by whether the parties’ industries are similar enough to 
suggest that a consumer could reasonably believe they come from the same 
commercial source.274 McDonald’s products were found proximate to 
McBagel’s because both offered restaurant industry services—hamburgers and 
bagels, respectively.275 Apple’s products may generally be characterized as 
technology goods, but more specifically would fall under computers and digital 
media.276 Shanghai ostensibly makes boats. Apple would want to point to the 
similarities between the products and avoid general differences. It could do so 
by arguing that what makes iBoat unique is its emphasis on technological 
innovation and its strong computer network, both of which are attributes that 
Apple products share. Thus, Shanghai’s product is not just a boat, but a highly 
advanced piece of technological equipment that just so happens to operate on 
water. The question would be: are Apple’s products to “iBoat” what a 
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hamburger fast food restaurant is to a bagel shop? The fact that the relative 
industries are very different likely suggests that the products are less than 
proximate. However, the “zone of protection may reach into the area of 
noncompeting goods . . . [and] extends to products . . . reasonably thought to 
originate from the same source.”277 This factor, therefore, appears neutral. 
The likelihood of expansion may work against Apple. A court measures 
the likelihood of expansion by determining whether there is substantial 
probative evidence that suggests the senior user may sell a similar product to the 
junior user’s in the future.278 In McDonald’s, “substantial probative evidence” 
demonstrated that McDonald’s had an ongoing program to test new products, 
and that it tested bagels under this program.279 Although Apple is a highly 
innovative company and likely has many ongoing programs to test new 
products, it has shown no signs of entering the transportation industry whether 
on land or on water. Apple may argue that because of its size and financial 
strength, no industry involving advanced technology is beyond its grasp. But the 
court will likely be more modest in providing scope to Apple’s protection; the 
court frowns on giving “boundless monopolies” even to such titans of industry 
as McDonald’s or Apple.280 Therefore, because Apple has not shown any 
interest in entering the transportation industry, it will likely fail to show a 
likelihood of expansion into the boating market. 
On the facts presented, Apple will be able to provide evidence of actual 
confusion. A court measures actual confusion in two ways: evidence of actual 
instances where consumers have been mistaken in the marketplace or survey 
evidence demonstrating that an objective subset of the consumer population 
would likely be confused by the similarity of the marks.281 Evidence of actual 
confusion is not essential to prove confusion, but it is highly persuasive.282 
McDonald’s demonstrated actual confusion by providing evidence that one of its 
managers received several inquiries concerning whether McDonald’s was going 
into the bagel business. McDonald’s also provided national and local survey 
evidence indicating confusion.283 Here, Apple may point to evidence 
demonstrating actual confusion. Apple has national and local survey evidence 
demonstrating that a substantial portion of the consumer population was 
mistaken by the marks. It also has the evidence of the boating showroom 
managers who testified that customers had inquired as to whether the iBoat was 
associated with Apple. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of confusion. 
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Shanghai’s use of the “i” mark appears to have been made in less than 
good faith. A court measures good faith by weighing evidence that the junior 
user had either knowledge or awareness of the senior user’s mark before 
adopting it for its own.284 The court in McDonald’s found that McBagel’s had 
acted in less than good faith because it marketed products using the “Mc” 
formative after McDonald’s had filed litigation. Also, McBagels had attempted 
to exploit the notoriety of the litigation by referencing it in McBagel’s’ 
marketing.285 Here, the facts suggest that Shanghai received notice of Apple’s 
litigation and still pursued marketing its product under the potentially infringing 
mark. Additionally, it is probably impossible for a company in today’s market to 
argue a lack of awareness of Apple’s dominant trademarks. Therefore, a court 
will likely find that Shanghai has acted with knowledge or awareness of Apple’s 
marks and that Shanghai, therefore, acted in bad faith. 
The relative quality of the parties’ products “reflects the law’s recognition 
that a prior owner should not be subjected to the risk that the public perception 
of the product will suffer if it is associated with a product of inferior quality.”286 
Product quality is not an essential element because the proponent is entitled to 
protection regardless of the quality of the second user’s product.287 Here, it 
appears that both products are of high quality so this factor appears neutral. 
The sophistication of the buyers weighs against Apple. Where buyers are 
unsophisticated or make their purchasing decisions quickly and casually, the 
likelihood of confusion increases.288 The court in McDonald’s found that 
consumers in the fast food industry do not make sophisticated restaurant 
choices.289 Consumers of high-end technology goods such as personal computers 
and digital media make less casual decisions than consumers in fast food. 
Because of the high price of an iBoat and the niche consumer whom it would 
attract, it is likely that the sophistication of such a consumer is high. It is more 
likely that a consumer in these industries would do their due diligence to learn 
about the relative products before making a purchase. Therefore, the 
sophistication of the buyers weighs in favor of Shanghai. 
In weighing the foregoing analysis, a court will likely find that the 
strength of Apple’s “i” mark, the similarity of that mark to “iBoat,” the evidence 
of actual confusion, and the evidence that the defendant acted in less than good 
faith favor a finding of the likelihood of confusion. However, it will likely find a 
lack of relatedness of the goods, the absence of a likelihood of expansion, a high 
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sophistication of the buyers and neutral findings as to relative quality favor a 
finding no likelihood of confusion. In HBP, Inc. v. American Marine Holdings, 
Inc., the court granted summary judgment to the defendant against the plaintiff’s 
likelihood of confusion claim because the plaintiff’s product of car races was 
materially different from the defendant’s boats.290 The relatedness of the goods 
can be a dispositive factor in the family of marks analysis.291 The outcome of 
this case will be determined by which factors the court chooses as most 
important. If the court rewards Apple for the substantial consumer recognition it 
has developed and finds persuasive Learned Hand’s argument that protection 
may exist across markets, then it may find for Apple. If, however, the court feels 
the boating transportation industry is just too different from personal electronics 
and that Apple has shown no interest in expansion into the boating market, it 
may deny Apple’s claim of infringement. If the court does not find that “iBoat” 
presents a likelihood of confusion, Apple may still have a claim for trademark 
dilution. 
B. Hypothetical #2: iRefrigerator 
An upstart technology company decided to switch gears recently from 
revolutionizing software to taking on the home appliance industry. The 
company’s name is Prophecy, Inc., and it seeks to be the world’s leader in home 
appliances. After numerous tries, it has come up with a working prototype for a 
new refrigerator. Prophecy’s refrigerator has internal climate settings within the 
refrigerator’s computer that allow different areas of the refrigerator to adapt to 
the different types of food stored there. The refrigerator’s computer also offers 
access to the internet so that temperatures and climates may be controlled 
remotely, as well as offering up-to-the-second notice of the refrigerator’s 
inventory, so that owners can simply check to see which groceries they need 
without having to make a physical list. The refrigerator also gives notices when 
certain products are close to expiring, provides health evaluations of the 
products stored in the refrigerator, and provides an environment for produce that 
simulates nature. 
After considering various trademarks for the refrigerator, Prophecy has 
come up with “iRefrigerator.” It debuted the product in early 2012 with an 
aggressive ad campaign that utilized marketing in newspapers, magazines such 
as Vogue, Newsweek and Time, billboards, TV commercials, and radio. 
Numerous third party tech blogs have noted that the sleekness of the design 
rivals LG and other producers. The iRefrigerator has already been picked up by 
major distributors such as Best Buy and Fry’s and has received much consumer 
attention and favorable reviews. By mid-2012, Apple filed a lawsuit against 
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Prophecy alleging that its iRefrigerator mark infringed Apple’s “i” family of 
marks. What should the court’s result be given the foregoing analysis? 
The first level of analysis shown above for Hypothetical #1 applies 
equally to an analysis of whether Apple has a protectable family mark here. The 
conclusions of that analysis again were: (1) the business Apple does under the 
“i” family is substantial because Apple has over 400 stores worldwide and 
thousands of authorized distributors and dealers; (2) the value of the products 
marketed under Apple’s “i” family is tremendous because 4 of Apple’s 26 “i” 
products account for near 75% of Apple’s $12 billion dollar yearly net revenue; 
(3) the period of time over which Apple has marketed the “i” mark is extensive, 
lasting roughly 15 years; and (4) Apple’s “i” mark is well established in the 
industry with strong corresponding consumer recognition because in 2011 alone 
it spent around $900 million in advertising and evidence exists of countless third 
party articles referencing the popularity of Apple’s “i” mark. Therefore, because 
Apple has a protectable family mark, a court will proceed to determine whether 
Prophecy’s “iRefrigerator” presents a likelihood of confusion. 
As stated above, Apple’s “i” family is strong as reflected by the amount 
of money Apple has invested in advertising and the corresponding consumer 
recognition it has gained in the market. The fact that the “i” prefix may be 
considered descriptive is of no effect, again, because of the substantial consumer 
recognition Apple has achieved with the mark and the secondary meaning it has 
created. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of protection. The similarity 
between Apple’s “i” family and “iRefrigerator” also favors protection because 
both marks use the “i” prefix and both Apple’s “i” family and the iRefrigerator 
attempt to be defined by technological excellence and innovation. Also, both 
marks are similarly advertised and to similar cross sections of the population. 
The similarities between the marks, therefore, favor protection. 
Prophecy will likely argue that the products are not proximate because 
Apple’s products focus on personal computers and digital media, whereas 
Prophecy markets its product in the home appliance market. The similarities 
between these industries, however, are far greater than the similarities between 
digital media and boats. This is a scenario where Learned Hand’s reasoning in 
Yale Electric v. Robertson becomes more persuasive. Additionally, because 
other tech companies have successfully branched out in the home appliance 
industry—LG and Samsung—this further suggests that it would not be 
unreasonable to expect Apple to do so one day. Therefore, while the products 
themselves are not particularly proximate, they may be close enough for a court 
to overlook their dissimilarities. Moreover, because Apple is such a large tech 
company and has so greatly expanded in the last fifteen years, it is foreseeable 
that, if they have not done so already, they may have plans or prototypes for 
expansions into home appliances. Whereas Apple was once just a computer 
company, now, they are world leaders in multi-media formats. Therefore, the 
likelihood of expansion into this industry is foreseeable. 
Although, no evidence of actual confusion exists on these facts, this 
factor is not necessary to a finding of likelihood of confusion. Again, because of 
 




Apple’s brand strength and widespread consumer recognition, it is almost 
impossible to imagine that a company could adopt an “i” trademark in good 
faith. A tech company would undoubtedly be aware of Apple’s strong use of the 
mark and Apple’s position in the field; therefore, any use of the mark 
subsequent to Apple’s dominance cannot be considered to be in good faith. The 
relative quality of the goods, as demonstrated in McDonald’s, is not essential to 
a finding of confusion and appears a non-factor on these facts. The 
sophistication of the buyers here works against Apple because consumers of 
Apple products are likely to be well educated and discerning. 
Therefore, because a majority of the McDonald’s factors weigh in favor 
of a finding of confusion, a court will likely find in Apple’s favor that 
Prophecy’s mark is infringing and will proceed to balance the relative harm to 
the parties. Here, because Prophecy proceeded to market its iRefrigerator with 
full awareness of Apple’s prior use, a court will likely find, similarly to the court 
in McDonald’s, that the junior user committed the infringement with awareness 
that it could be forced to abandon the mark. 
A disclaimer of association as discussed in Gallo would not be 
appropriate for the same reasons addressed in that case, mainly because such a 
disclaimer would not alleviate consumer confusion and could potentially dilute 
the strength of Apple’s family. Therefore, a court will likely grant a full 
injunction to Apple. 
C. Hypothetical #3: iTV 
Recently, an overseas company that had been doing research in the 
computer monitor field got an idea. It decided that it would use its knowledge of 
flat screen computer monitors to create a line of ultra-modern, ultra-stylish TVs 
that incorporate computer technology. The company is called Corsaire, Inc., and 
has developed a cult-like status in the electronics business for developing 
interesting patents and selling them to major manufacturers who are more able 
to develop the ideas. It finally has generated enough capital and has decided to 
go into business for itself. It created a prototype for a new TV, which will be a 
very narrow flat screen that offers wireless access to the internet and ideal 
picture quality. Corsaire is marketing 42-inch, 50-inch, and 64-inch models and 
believes the product will be an instant hit. After debating what trademark it 
should use, Corsaire settled on “iTV” because it thought that the mark described 
perfectly what the TV does and because it believed that, because Apple does not 
offer a competing television, Apple’s marks should not apply to them. Corsaire 
debuted the product in early 2012 and marketed it to major distributors and in 
major publications. Initially, the market was skeptical of the product, but 
eventually it caught on. Corsaire gained significant market share when the 
product began to be distributed in Costcos throughout the United States. In mid-
2012, Apple brought a trademark infringement action against Corsaire arguing 
that its “iTV” mark was confusingly similar to Apple’s family of “i” products. 
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Corsaire stated in various publications that it plans to vigorously fight the 
litigation. What should the court’s result be given the foregoing analysis? 
Apple will be able to demonstrate that it is entitled to family mark 
protection in its “i” mark; therefore, a court will proceed to a likelihood of 
confusion analysis. Under this analysis, Apple will be able to demonstrate that 
its family mark is strong and that Corsaire’s mark is similar to Apple’s due to: 
(1) Apple’s immense consumer recognition in the technology industry, (2) the 
similarity in style of the respective marks, and (3) similar marketing channels 
used by the companies. 
Additionally, Apple has created products that attempt to bridge the gap 
between digital media and TV.292 Apple has also speculated on creating a device 
extremely similar to Corsaire’s in media sources, and it is likely that Apple has 
tested a similar product.293 Therefore, both the proximity of Apple’s products 
and the likelihood of its expansion into the TV market favor protection of 
Apple’s family mark. In addition, because consumer expectation and a certain 
amount of the population already anticipate that Apple’s product will be entitled 
“iTV,” there will undoubtedly be examples of actual consumer confusion.294 
Because of Apple’s size and power, no tech company using an “i” mark to 
seriously market their products could be found to have adopted such a mark in 
good faith. Therefore, this factor would weigh against Corsaire. Finally, the 
relative quality of the goods and the sophistication of the parties appear to be 
non-factors in this analysis. Because six of the eight factors under the likelihood 
of confusion favor protecting Apple’s family mark, a court is likely to find that 
Corsaire has infringed Apple’s mark. After weighing the relative harm to the 
parties and determining that the court cannot mitigate the harm to Corsaire 
without diluting Apple’s family, a court should grant Apple a full injunction. 
CONCLUSION 
While initially of uncertain birth, the family of marks doctrine has grown 
to be a viable common law protection within intellectual property law. Debate 
may be fruitful concerning whom this doctrine truly benefits—seemingly large 
companies with the ability to throw as many products as possible in front of 
consumers in order to gain recognition and promotion—as well as whether it is 
worth providing additional protection to companies of the stature of a 
McDonald’s or Apple, whose products themselves so clearly dominate their 
respective markets. However, the doctrine is consistent with providing 
  
 292 Apple, Inc., WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple,_Inc#Apple_TV (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2013). 
 293 Michael Comeau, Four Reasons Why iTV Will Be the Easiest Money Apple’s Ever 
Made, MINYANVILLE (Oct. 27, 2011, 11:40 AM), http://www.minyanville.com/ 
businessmarkets/articles/apple-products-smartphone-iPhone-biographer-
walter/10/27/2011/id/37612/. 
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protection to the ingenuity of a company’s development and marketing 
strategy.295 No greater example of such a strategy can be seen than in the way 
Apple has used the spirit behind the family of marks doctrine to promote its 
company over the last fifteen years. With the barbarians of the market encircling 
Apple’s Tiber, Apple must consider using the shield and sword of the family of 
marks doctrine before its “i” mark is lost to history.296 
  
 295 It makes sense that, in a nation that rewards innovation with legal protection, a 
similar and near absolute protection would be afforded the name under which that 
innovation is sold. 
 296 Alternate ending: In moving forward with its dominance of the technology market, 
Apple may likely rely legally on a doctrine that was almost certainly born of market 
ingenuity. 
